



# **ANIMAL DISEASE RESPONSE PLAN**

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## **FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000**

This document will be made publicly available through the SRF website. Where content has been redacted under the freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOI) in the publically available version, the paragraph number will be highlighted to show there has been a redaction and the relevant section of FOI referenced.

## **ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION REGULATIONS 2004**

This plan presumes disclosure of all environmental information, under Environment Information Regulations. Where exemptions are claimed under Environment Information Regulation 12 (5)a, this will only be where one of the responder agencies has judged that the information may adversely affect either international relations, defence, national security or public safety. Where such content has been identified, the paragraph number will be highlighted and the paragraph text removed from public versions of the plan.

## **DATA PROTECTION ACT 1998**

This plan does not include personal data that has been shared under the Data Protection Act 1998. It does include data relevant to achieve planning arrangements and identifies how more specific personal data will be used during any emergency.

## **REVIEW**

This plan will be reviewed by the Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit (JEPU) and Suffolk Trading Standards (SCC TS) on behalf of Suffolk County Council and the Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF) at least every 3 years. Earlier reviews will take place if there is a change in legislation, new animal diseases identified or information from other animal disease incidents and exercises where lessons are identified.

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## **DISTRIBUTION**

### **Organisation**

DCLG Resilience and Emergencies  
Division

Animal & Plant Health Agency

Suffolk Constabulary

Suffolk Fire and Rescue

NHS England – Midlands & East (East)  
East of England Ambulance Service NHS  
Trust

Environment Agency

Public Health England – East of England  
Health Protection Team

Port Health Authority

Suffolk County Council

Suffolk Trading Standards  
Joint Emergency Planning Unit

Babergh District Council

Forest Heath District Council

Ipswich Borough Council

Mid-Suffolk District Council

St Edmundsbury Borough Council

Suffolk Coastal District Council

Waveney District Council

Local Government Association

National Farmers Union

National Pig Association

Royal Society for Prevention of Cruelty to  
Animals (RSPCA)

Royal Society for the Protection of Birds  
(RSPB)

Natural England

Highways England

## AMENDMENT RECORD

Amendment	Date	Amended by	Summary
1	07/09/2016	Sue Herne	Defra have updated their Contingency plans so links have been amended to these latest versions.

## PLAN VALIDATION & EXERCISE LOG

Details the date, type of exercise and any pertinent comments each time the plan is exercised.

Date	Type	Name	Comments
03/02/07	Incident	Holton	H5N1 AI Outbreak – Ex Blackrock Feb 07 cancelled in lieu of incident; full review of plan post incident debrief
21/09/07	Incident	Baylam	Blue Tongue Virus – Emergence of virus in UK
11/11/07	Incident	Op Nipper - Redgrave	H5N1 AI Outbreak – confirmed plan review
24/02/09	Incident	Ubbeston	Low Pathogenic AI outbreak. No further action following veterinary investigations. Confirmed plan activation and Suffolk Coordinating Group activation
14/04/13	Incident	Ubbeston	Low Pathogenic AI outbreak. No further action following veterinary investigations. Some confusion over notification process from APHA to Suffolk TS addressed in 2013 plan review.
11/02/15	Exercise	CUJO	A table top multi agency exercise to test the plan raise awareness & knowledge of Rabies
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/ /			

# 1. INTRODUCTION

This multi-agency plan provides a generic framework for the Suffolk response to and management of an outbreak of an exotic notifiable animal disease and is supported by individual agency plans to deliver the [Roles and Responsibilities](#) outlined in paragraph 6.

A notifiable disease is one that, by law, has to be notified to the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), an executive agency working on behalf of the Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs (Defra).

This plan is linked to higher level national plans and to related Suffolk Resilience Forum Plans:

[Defra's Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals in England](#)<sup>1</sup>

[Defra's GB & NI Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals](#)<sup>2</sup>

[SRF Generic Emergency Response Plan](#)

[SRF Recovery Plan](#)

[SRF Communications Plan](#)

Defra's disease control strategy aims to:

- Eradicate the disease and regain disease-free status;
- Protect the health and safety of the public and those directly involved in controlling the outbreak; and
- Minimise the burden on the taxpayer and public as well as the economic impact of the outbreak on industry.

In addition Defra will endeavour to:

- Keep to a minimum the number of animals that have to be humanely destroyed either for disease control purposes or to safeguard animal welfare; and
- Minimise adverse impacts on animal welfare, the rural and wider economy, the public, rural communities and the environment.

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<sup>1</sup> The version dated March 2016

<sup>2</sup> The version dated March 2015

## 2. AIM

The aim of this plan is to set out a multi-agency emergency response to an outbreak of an exotic notifiable animal disease by providing the structures, systems and arrangements to deliver the following objectives.

## 3. OBJECTIVES

- Assist APHA and Defra in the control of any outbreak of a notifiable animal disease within the county.
- Protect human health in the event of a zoonotic animal disease.
- Provide accurate and timely information to the public and local business on the rules designed to control the disease outbreak and possible human/animal health implications.
- Manage the wider impact on Suffolk of specific response measures to minimise disruption to the countryside, transport networks and to rural communities.
- Provide support to local business and communities during the recovery phase following an outbreak.

## 4. RISK

Suffolk has both significant commercial and social animal activity which is of substantial value to the economy and welfare of the county and its population. Any outbreak would have a significant effect and should not be underestimated or undervalued.

The risk of an outbreak of animal disease in Suffolk is covered within the Suffolk Community Risk Register published on the [Suffolk Resilience Forum website](#).

As part of an ongoing process, animal diseases are evaluated in liaison with APHA and Defra to ensure the plan reflects an appropriate response to new or developing risks. The high impact animal diseases are summarised below and form the basis of this plan. Those diseases with clear human health impacts (zoonotic diseases) have been marked with an\*.

### **Suffolk High Impact Animal Diseases**

#### **Foot and Mouth (FMD)**

The last national outbreak of FMD was in 2007. FMD is probably more infectious than any other livestock disease and spreads rapidly if uncontrolled. Cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, deer and other cloven-hoofed species are susceptible. Control measures such as animal movement restrictions and footpath closures may apply. An outbreak either locally or nationally could have a major impact on the Suffolk agricultural and tourism economies.

#### **Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (AI)\***

Since mid-December 2003, a growing number of countries have reported outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in chickens and ducks, with significant outbreaks in Europe and the UK becoming more frequent. One strain known as H5N1 has been identified as the cause of most of these outbreaks. This strain is a



major cause for concern in human health planning as it can jump the species barrier and has caused human deaths. It has the capacity of becoming a human pandemic. The rapid spread with outbreaks occurring at the same time in several countries is historically unprecedented and of some concern for human health as well as for agriculture. An outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Suffolk will have a major impact on the Suffolk economy, typically placing controls on poultry, poultry products, animals, and in some instances people.

### **Blue Tongue Virus (BTV)**

In 2007 this viral disease occurred for the first recorded time in the UK. The virus is carried by midges (genus *Culicoides*). These midges are usually killed by colder West and North European winter climates. However, recent prolonged milder winters, have allowed the midge to successfully 'over-winter' in Western Europe. Its impact on ruminant livestock (sheep, cattle, goats and deer), associated control zone distances and longevity to eradicate it, makes it comparable with; FMD, AI or CSF. An outbreak either locally or nationally could have a significant impact on the respective agricultural and tourism economies.

### **Classical Swine Fever (CSF)**

The last outbreak in East Anglia was in 2000. Although less infectious than FMD the control measures would be similar and any outbreak in Suffolk would have a major impact on the local agricultural and tourism economies.

### **Newcastle Disease**

The last outbreak in England occurred in 2005. It is caused by a virus which can infect a wide variety of birds, and may result in severe losses - similar effect to AI.

### **Aujeszky's Disease**

The last outbreak of the disease in GB was in 1989. It is caused by a porcine virus that primarily affects pigs but can be spread to other animals. Control measures include destruction of stock and would be likely to have a major impact on the local agricultural and tourism economies.

### **Rabies\***

The current risk of an outbreak of rabies in Suffolk is deemed to be LOW following the virtual eradication of the disease in Western Europe. However rabies is still a major threat in Asia and Eastern Europe and could be introduced to the UK via an illegal import. The greatest risk to humans would be from contact with infected dogs and cats. If the virus were to be introduced into wildlife in Great Britain, then the fox would be the most likely reservoir species. Any outbreak would have a major impact on the local economy, potentially affecting tourism and leading to controls on cats, dogs, people and wildlife. For more information on the disease see

[www.gov.uk/rabies](http://www.gov.uk/rabies)

### **Glanders and Farcy\***

Glanders and Farcy is a serious bacterial disease of the respiratory tract and skin, affecting mainly horses and other equine animals. The disease is called "glanders" when the principal lesions are seen in the nostrils, submaxillary glands and lungs and is called "farcy" when located on the surface of limbs or body. Apparently recovered animals remain carriers and infection occurs by ingestion. Humans can be

infected from affected horses by contamination through an open wound. If untreated, the mortality rate in humans is as high as 95%. Dogs, cats and wild carnivores can also be infected.

### **West Nile Virus (WNV)\***

A viral infection of birds, horses and humans, spread by mosquitoes and can cause encephalitis (inflammation of the brain) or meningitis (inflammation of the lining of the brain and spinal cord) and may lead to human fatalities. West Nile Virus has never been recorded in the UK, however recent research has found antibodies against the virus present in birds in Great Britain, suggesting past or present infection with WNV.

### **African Horse Sickness**

An infectious viral disease that is spread by insects. It affects horses, mules and donkeys, with infected animals usually dying. The disease is not directly contagious between horses, and is present (endemic) in sub-Saharan Africa. The disease has, on occasions, occurred in Europe with previous cases reported in Spain and Portugal.

### **Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA) - or "swamp fever"**

A viral disease of horses causing intermittent fever, anemia, emaciation and death. It can be transmitted by mechanical transfer of blood or by biting insects and occurs typically in low-lying swampy areas. EIA has a worldwide distribution; outbreaks between 1980 and 1989 were reported in many parts of America, Asia (India, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, and Thailand), Europe (Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Romania, USSR and Yugoslavia) and Australia. EIA was confirmed in the UK in 2010.

NOTE: Zoonotic diseases are defined by the World Health Organisation as "diseases and infections which are naturally transmitted between vertebrate animals and man". Those marked \* above are zoonotic insofar as there is a high likelihood of transmission of the disease to humans, additionally in exceptional circumstances, both Foot and Mouth and Newcastle disease can be transmitted to humans.

## **5. PLAN ACTIVATION**

The plan will be activated on notification of a suspect or confirmed outbreak of a high impact or other notifiable animal disease as listed in paragraph 4.

The process to be used is outlined below, a summary is shown in **Appendix A**.

### **5.1 High Impact Animal Disease – Suspect**

Notification of a **suspect** high impact notifiable animal disease.

Following a notification from APHA, Suffolk Trading Standards will immediately alert Suffolk JEPUs (out of hours direct to the JEPUs Duty Officer) and Public Health England (PHE) (out of hours via Medicom).

Suffolk JEPUs will alert other SRF partners as required and whilst Suffolk Trading Standards will closely monitor the situation with Defra / APHA and provide a filter for routine reports to prevent false alarms.

Suffolk Trading Standards will initiate the next step if disease is confirmed.

## 5.2 High Impact Animal Disease – Confirmed

Notification of a **confirmed** high impact notifiable animal disease.

Following a notification from APHA, Suffolk Trading Standards will immediately alert Suffolk JEPUs (out of hours direct to the JEPUs Duty Officer) and Public Health England (out of hours via Medicom).

SRF partners will be notified and a multi-agency framework will be established. Dependent on the situation the coordination of the response may be taken in the form of a 'Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) Lite'. The SCG would meet to review the situation and to endorse local courses of action to support any response.

Suffolk Trading Standards as the local subject matter experts (supported by JEPUs) will act as the focal point for Suffolk County Council's response and provide advice and guidance to the multi-agency response framework.

Suffolk Trading Standards will provide support and assistance to Defra / APHA when requested and will interface with their Local Disease Control Centre on behalf of the SRF partnership.

## 5.3 Other Notifiable Animal Disease – Suspect

Notification of a **suspect** notifiable animal disease not listed as high impact in paragraph 4.

Following a notification from APHA, Suffolk Trading Standards will alert Suffolk JEPUs (out of hours direct to the JEPUs Duty Officer if necessary) and Public Health England (out of hours via Medicom).

Suffolk Trading Standards will liaise with Suffolk JEPUs and Public Health England to agree a process for alerting other SRF partners as required and will closely monitor the situation with Defra / APHA and provide a filter for routine reports to prevent false alarms.

Suffolk Trading Standards will initiate the next step if disease is confirmed.

## 5.4 Other Notifiable Animal Disease – Confirmed

Notification of a **confirmed** notifiable animal disease not listed as high impact.

Following notification from APHA, Suffolk Trading Standards will immediately alert Suffolk JEPUs (out of hours direct to the JEPUs Duty Officer) and Public Health England (out of hours via Medicom).

Suffolk Trading Standards will liaise with Suffolk JEPUs and Public Health England to agree a process for alerting other SRF partners as required and will closely monitor the situation with Defra / APHA and provide a filter for routine reports.

Suffolk Trading Standards as the local subject matter experts (supported by JEPUs) will act as the focal point for Suffolk County Council's response and provide advice and guidance to the multi-agency response framework.

Suffolk Trading Standards will provide support and assistance to Defra / APHA when requested and will interface with their Local Disease Control Centre on behalf of the SRF partnership.

Suffolk Trading Standards, in liaison with APHA, will advise if the scale of incident requires a meeting of the Suffolk Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG).

### 5.5 Major Incident

When an outbreak exceeds the capacity of an agency to respond effectively or places exceptional resource demands on them consideration will be given to the declaration of a Major Incident.

## 6. GENERIC RESPONSE ACTIVITIES

The [Suffolk Generic Response Plan](#) sets out the generic response arrangements within Suffolk.

Defra is the lead government department for responding to a notifiable animal disease incident and the APHA is the delivery agency responsible for animal health and welfare in England, Scotland and Wales. Their generic plan can be found at [Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals](#).

Control policies for the main diseases are published in [Control Strategies](#) and reflect a framework of EU and national law. Where there is no published control strategy, national legislation sets out the control measures to be applied, and for reference [Appendix-A](#) sets out the general principles of control as specified in the Defra national plan.

Suffolk Trading Standards provides the local authority animal health function with the responsibility for enforcing animal disease controls.

Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) - For non zoonotic diseases there would be no requirement for a STAC. In a zoonotic outbreak a STAC may be required and is the responsibility of Public Health England. Animal health related scientific and technical advice will come from the Defra Chief Scientific Officer, via APHA or Suffolk Trading Standards. **It should be noted that this is most likely to be via telecon**

The management of an animal disease outbreak in Suffolk will vary depending on the type of disease. This process will follow a rising tide scenario whereby the management of the response will be expandable to meet the scale and spread of

any outbreak. In addition, the management structure will interface with APHA who will operate from their own premises with their own structures as outlined in the national plan.

The response to an animal disease outbreak may involve the following:

- Restriction in the movement of animals, people and vehicles on and around infected site/premises.
- Implementing protection, surveillance and restricted zones around confirmed/suspected infected site/premises.
- The administration of prophylaxis to infected or potentially infected members of the public.
- Positioning of public warning and information signage.
- Restriction or closure of public rights of way within protection zones.
- Introduction of bio security measures.
- Vaccination of susceptible animals
- Slaughter of infected/suspect stock.
- Disposal of infected/suspect stock.

Informal arrangements are in place for Suffolk Trading Standards to call upon support from their colleagues in Norfolk, Essex and Cambridgeshire County Councils. However, if the outbreak is widespread across the region, these other trading standards staff will be focused on their own counties response.

## 7. WARNING AND INFORMING

### 7.1 National Alert Status

A standard alert system has been adopted to describe the current status of a specific exotic notifiable disease outbreak or incident.

**WHITE** - disease is not present or suspected in the country.

**BLACK** - risk of disease is perceived as higher than normal or confirmed in nearby EU member state.

**AMBER** - suspicion of disease based on clinical grounds following a veterinary enquiry.

**RED** - confirmation of first case of disease (or operational response otherwise initiated or declared by Defra as appropriate).

See the national plan at [Defra's Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals](#) for further information and for information on the response structures and processes that will be used by APHA and Defra.

### 7.2 Media

The media interest in any outbreak of an exotic notifiable animal disease, based upon historical evidence, is likely to be very high for the first cases within the UK (national and regional media).

If the situation warrants it Suffolk Trading Standards, with support from JEPU and the other agencies involved, will liaise with the on-call Suffolk County Council and

the relevant District/Borough/Agency communications officers so work can start on developing a media strategy.

The management of the Suffolk media response will be guided by the [SRF Communications Plan](#). Communications staff will need to maintain a link with APHA and Defra to ensure that a common communications message is produced, once an outbreak has been confirmed.

## 8. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The [Suffolk Generic Response Plan](#) identifies the main roles and responsibilities of responding agencies. Those listed below are specific for this plan.

### 8.1 APHA

Manage and coordinate the components of response to, control of and eradication of an animal disease outbreak.

### 8.2 Public Health England

Public Health England is the lead responder for public health incidents and will liaise and involve other health agencies and organisations as required. Specifically they will:

- Convene an Outbreak Control Team
- Implement the Joint Communicable Disease Incident / Outbreak Management plan, if required.

### 8.3 National Health Service

- The administration of prophylaxis to infected or potentially infected members of the public.
- The administration of vaccines to prevent the spread of disease
- The taking of samples as part of any monitoring process

### 8.4 Suffolk County Council

- Assist APHA with the provision of resources such as staff, vehicles equipment and buildings where necessary (e.g. for a Forward Operating Base) dependent on availability of those resources and external priorities, and support Trading Standards response in the following areas:
- Co-ordinate requests for volunteers to all responder agencies to support APHA and Trading Standards enquiries.
- Door-to-Door Enquiries - Provide staff to augment Trading Standards' door to door enquires for domestic animals susceptible to the notifiable disease identified.
- Provide administrative, office-based support, to Trading Standards licensing activities during an outbreak.
- Liaise with APHA/ SCC TS in identification of an appropriate location for a Media Liaison Point.
- Lead the recovery once specific animal disease related activity has ceased

- Support Public Health England as required
- Provision and Erecting of footpath and road signs for publicising the Protection and Surveillance Zones (or Infected Area if it is an outbreak of Rabies) around a premises where disease has been confirmed at appropriate junction of roads and boundaries.
- Provide public information including foreign language support capability.
- Provide and update public website information as appropriate.
- Provide advice on the disposal of slaughtered carcasses if in county options are being considered. (N.B: this is VERY unlikely).
- Disposal of dumped carcasses
- Provide extra call centre capability through the Suffolk Emergency Help line.

#### 8.5 District / Borough Councils

- Assist APHA with the provision of resources such as staff, vehicles equipment and buildings where necessary (e.g. for a Forward Operating Base) dependent on availability of those resources and external priorities, and support Trading Standards response in the following areas:
- Co-ordinate requests for volunteers to all responder agencies to support APHA & Trading Standards enquiries.
- Door-to-Door Enquiries - Provide staff to augment Trading Standards' door to door enquires for domestic animals susceptible to the notifiable disease identified.
- Provide advice on public health implications of the disease control operations (e.g. disposal operations).
- Provide Collection and detention of stray cats and dogs outside of control zones during an animal disease outbreak.
- Provide public information including foreign language support capability.
- Provide support on the disposal of slaughtered carcasses if in county options are being considered. (N.B: this is VERY unlikely).
- Provide extra call centre capability.

#### 8.6 Suffolk Trading Standards

- Responsible for the enforcement of Animal Health legislation, including movement restrictions/licensing and enforcement within Control Zones.
- Co-ordinate local disease management arrangements.
- Liaise with JEPU for implementation of contingency plans and support response.
- Respond to enquires from farmers/industry/general public.
- Monitor livestock welfare, especially on transport and at markets.
- Provide assistance with control of cleansing and disinfecting premises and licensed animal gatherings and slaughterhouses.
- Maintain effective liaison with other local operational partners.
- Provide a representative at the APHA Local Disease Control Centre.
- Provide advice on enforcement.

- Proactively disseminate advice and education to local communities through established communications channels (SRF Communication Plan).
- Liaise with APHA to obtain appropriate GIS data to support foot patrols and planning response.
- Co-ordinate location of road signage with SCC and/or Highways England.

#### 8.7 Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit

- Warn and notify local authority responders and advise adjacent county local authorities as appropriate.
- Local authority emergency management coordination through relevant council Emergency Control Centre(s) and SRF incident management structures as appropriate.

#### 8.8 Suffolk Constabulary

- The maintenance of wider public order and public protection.
- Policing and patrolling any designated control zones in partnership with Local Authorities.
- Providing a presence at infected premises if required to assist partner agencies to maintain law and order.
- Providing specialist knowledge on the management and control of major incidents.
- Work in partnership with the Local Authorities and APHA to share intelligence.
- Provide support and advice regarding traffic management to facilitate field operations, such as road closures or escorts to disposal points, closures of rights of way and footpaths.
- Enforce movement control in close partnership with Local Authorities.
- Assist in enforcing restrictions on activities that may propagate the spread of the disease e.g. hunting, shooting.

## **9. RESOURCES**

### 9.1 Equipment

Additional equipment required outside of that already held by multi-agency responders to support this plan will be sourced by those agencies as required.

Stockholdings of equipment held should be sufficient to meet the responder's roles in the event of a major outbreak.

In the event of a disease outbreak that requires the collection and temporary housing of stray cats and dogs. Suffolk Trading Standards can gain access to the East of England Trading Standards Association (EETSA) Regional Animal Health Equipment Store. All the equipment is kept within an ISO container which can be quickly collected and transported to a suitable site to enable the creation of a dog and cat pound.



Procurement of equipment and supplies during an emergency response should wherever possible follow existing agency procedures although exceptions may be made where timing or geographical situations dictate.

## 9.2 Finance

Initially the provision of support to an emergency response is provided at cost to the providing organisation.

Where costs are significant, application can be made via the Bellwin Scheme (Local Authority and Fire) to Department of Communities and Local Government for the relief of some or all of the costs related to the emergency response.


Reasonable effort should be made to accurately record expenditure incurred during an incident as other schemes may be made available that allows agencies to reclaim some, or all, of the additional costs incurred.

## **10. RECOVERY**

Confirmation of the termination and lifting of restrictions following an animal disease outbreak will be provided by Defra / APHA.

On completion of specific animal disease related activity at a business location, the local authority assumes responsibility for the remaining recovery actions as outlined in the [Suffolk Generic Recovery Plan](#).

## Appendix A – Suffolk Notification Process



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**Organisation / Department contact details are in the SRF Alerting Directory**

Suffolk Constabulary  
NHS England  
Environment Agency National Incident Helpline  
East of England Ambulance Service  
SCC Director of Public Health  
SCC Communications  
Suffolk Fire and Rescue Control (Fire Control)  
Suffolk County Council - Duty Director  
SCC Economy Skills and Environment (ES and E) for info  
Public Health England

**District / Borough councils according to incident location:**

Babergh District Council & Mid Suffolk District Council  
Forest Heath District Council & St Edmundsbury Borough Council  
Ipswich Borough Council  
Suffolk Coastal District Council & Waveney District Council

## **Appendix-B: General Principles of Control**

### **Area and Premises Restrictions & Movement Controls**

In general, a report of suspicion of exotic notifiable disease triggers an official investigation by APHA that may place temporary statutory restrictions on that premises; initial verbal restrictions are confirmed in writing if disease cannot be ruled out by clinical inspection carried out by a Veterinary Officer.

Depending on the disease concerned, these restrictions may apply to the whole premises or just to individual animals, would usually include a ban on the movement of susceptible animals on and off the suspect premises and may include restrictions on other things liable to transmit disease.

During the suspicion phase of certain diseases (e.g. Avian Influenza, Foot and Mouth Disease, African Swine Fever) a Temporary Control Zone (TCZ) may also be declared around the premises under suspicion. This zone will apply specific measures and will be of a size considered necessary to address risk of spread. If disease is confirmed, APHA are likely to impose a PZ surrounded by a larger SZ

Restrictions would remain in place until the official investigations are complete and an exotic notifiable disease can be ruled out.

If disease is confirmed, the primary objective is to prevent the spread of disease by:

- Taking action on the Infected Premises (IP) and other affected premises where disease is most likely (e.g. those linked by recent animal movements either to or from the IP);
- Imposing, in most cases, wider area based controls as required by legislation including animal movement controls (in the case of FMD in particular, GB administrations may impose national movement restrictions on susceptible animals);
- Restricting activities that might increase the risk of spread (e.g. there might be a ban on hunting or shooting);
- Placing controls on animal products;
- Considering export bans;
- Investigating the origin of the disease and determining whether there has been further spread of disease from that source; and
- Other surveillance to investigate possible further spread of disease.

Control strategies and legislation set out the policies relating to the types of zone for different diseases and minimum sizes and duration of zones.

### **Premises Restrictions**

Premises restrictions are put in place by the competent authority to ensure that a disease agent is not moved off the premises. Restrictions prevent the movement of animals susceptible to the particular disease onto and off the premises.

Depending on the disease concerned, the movement of people, non-susceptible animals, animal products, feed and fodder, vehicles and anything else potentially contaminated with infectious material, off and onto the premises may also be restricted. Subject to legislative requirements, a veterinary risk assessment and suitable biosecurity procedures, they may be allowed to move off and on to the premises under licence.

The rules concerning the premises will be set out in the notice served on the animal keeper and also any licence will specify conditions permitting movements onto and off the premises or restricted place.

As an additional precaution, rights of way (e.g. footpaths, bridleways, etc.) or land to which the public have a right of access will normally be closed and access to those premises will be limited.

### Area Restrictions

In any exotic notifiable disease outbreak or incident, there will initially be a degree of uncertainty about the origin of the disease, how long it has been present and its spread. Because of this uncertainty, area restrictions are imposed for many diseases to stop animal movements into, from and within the restricted area.

During the suspicion phase of certain diseases, a Temporary Control Zone (TCZ) may be declared around the premises under suspicion.

Upon confirmation of most exotic notifiable diseases covered by this plan, a PZ, surrounded by a larger SZ would be imposed around the IP by Statutory Order. To reflect the increased risk of transmission of disease, controls within the PZ would be more stringent than those within the SZ. In the case of Rabies, an infected area may be imposed by Statutory Order that could be sub-divided into further zones, each with their own set of controls.

For those diseases or circumstances where confirmation would not result in a PZ and SZ being imposed, legislation and the relevant disease control strategy, provides for other types of controlled zones to be imposed. Although known by various terms, their main objective is to reduce the risk of disease spreading beyond the known affected area.

### Controls and Restrictions in the PZ and SZ

In general, controls are primarily focused on the movement of animals since, for most diseases, this is the most potent method of spreading disease. Legislation includes controls on vehicles, fomites (things that may physically carry the disease agent), meat, animal products (including meat products, eggs, hides and in some cases milk and milk products derived from animals in the zones) and on the carcasses of animals.

Animal keepers within the control zones may be required to carry out additional biosecurity measures and report any suspicion of disease.

Whilst the zones are in place, APHA will carry out surveillance, involving clinical inspection, examination and possibly sampling for laboratory testing in the areas to demonstrate that disease has not spread. In extensive outbreaks or incidents, where there may be a large number of PZ and SZ areas declared, the areas may overlap to form a very large PZ and SZ which may increase the time required to carry out the required surveillance to demonstrate freedom.

## **Exemptions to Movement Restrictions**

### **Licensing**

As investigations in to an outbreak or incident progress, it will become clearer where the risks of disease spread lie.

Depending on the circumstances, subject to veterinary risk assessment and statutory requirements, exemptions to controls may be granted using specific or general licences issued by the competent authority. These licences set out criteria (e.g. veterinary inspection, cleansing and disinfection, monitoring, etc.) that must be met before, during or after the move.

Each UK administration operates its own licensing regime. Co-ordination and co-operation between the administrations provides a coherent approach to moves across administrative borders. Each administration will discuss its strategy for exit from movement controls with relevant stakeholders and identify priorities for change, subject to risk assessment, the disease situation at the time and within the requirements of the legislative framework.

### **Welfare Moves**

It is important that all animal keepers have contingency plans in place to deal with prolonged movement restrictions, because pressures on accommodation can arise quickly and this is especially so in the pig and poultry sector.

The welfare of animals is the responsibility of the keeper of the animals and where there is suffering due to overcrowding the keeper may have to arrange for those animals to be humanely culled.

Immediately following the imposition of movement controls, consideration will be given to making licences available to permit certain movements for welfare purposes (e.g. dairy cow movements for milking, movements to permit treatment by veterinary surgeons, etc.) subject to assessment of the risk. The conditions of these licences will require such moves take place under suitable biosecurity arrangements.

### **Enforcement**

The area movement restrictions and the licensing conditions are enforced by local authorities in England.

### **Public Access to the Countryside Falling Within Control Zones**

The risks of disease being spread by those seeking recreational access to the countryside are very small, and can be reduced further by avoiding direct contact with animals. In the event of a disease outbreak, there will be a presumption in favour of access to the countryside, subject to veterinary risk assessment.

### International Controls and Controls on Animal Products

In the event of a disease outbreak or incident and depending on the disease, the UK may lose its OIE international disease free status which may prevent the export of animals and their products.

Within the EU, depending on the disease, there may also be a ban on intra community trade of susceptible animals, animal products, meat or meat products and milk and dairy products from the whole country or parts of it. Although these products may not be traded within the community, subject to the disease and any movement restrictions in place, they may be traded on the domestic market with a domestic health mark (round stamp).

In the case of trade with third countries (i.e. those countries that are not members of the EU or EFTA (The European Free Trade Association)), export certificates may be withdrawn until the situation has been clarified with the importing country.

### Regionalisation

Depending on the disease situation it may be possible, following a risk assessment, to divide the country into areas defined as free of disease, low risk and high risk. This would allow the relaxation of some controls and allow additional movements within an area of the same status and from free or low risk areas to high risk areas. Regionalisation is dependent on the epidemiology of the disease, accurate up to date information on its geographical distribution and seasonal trade patterns. Laboratory surveillance may be required to demonstrate freedom from disease in a region. Proposals to regionalise must be acceptable to the other UK administrations, the European Commission and other trading partners. Regionalisation would also impose restrictions on animal and animal product movements to maintain the region's disease status. This may have an adverse economic effect that outweighs any short term advantage of regionalisation and economic considerations must be taken into account in coming to decisions on regionalisation.

### Compartmentalisation

EU legislation enables intra-Community trade to resume relatively quickly once a disease is under control. However the resumption of trade with third country trading partners can take many more months.

Compartmentalisation is a concept that allows companies, in the event of a disease outbreak, to resume trade quickly with 'third countries' who have "signed up" to the scheme. Companies must meet the conditions of EC Regulation 616/2009 which includes strict biosecurity measures and the requirement for premises to be approved by Government. At the present time, compartmentalisation applies only to certain poultry premises in the event of an avian influenza outbreak.

## Appendix C - Glossary

APHA	Animal and Plant Health Agency – agency of Defra
DCLG	Department for Communities and Local Government
Defra	Department for Food and Rural Affairs
DCZ	Disease Control Zone
EA	Environment Agency
EETSA	East of England Trading Standards Authorities
RM	Resource Management
FOB	Forward Operating Base
GIS	Geographical Information System - Mapping and geographic data system
IP	Infected Premises
JEPU	Suffolk Local Authorities Joint Emergency Planning Unit
LDCC	Local Disease Control Centre (APHA Control Centre)
LRF	Local Resilience Forum (Civil Contingencies Act defined local area responders – Police Force area.)
NDCC	National Disease Control Centre
NHS	National Health Service
PHE	Public Health England
PZ	Protection Zone
SCC	Suffolk County Council
SRF	Suffolk Resilience Forum
STAC	Scientific and Technical Advisory Cell
SZ	Surveillance Zone
TCZ	Temporary Control Zone
TS	Trading Standards – lead department within SCC for Animal Health issues
Zoonotic	Animal disease transferable across species, animal to human